Restoring Korea Zinc’s Governance,
Restoring Korea Zinc’s Governance,
Restoring Korea Zinc’s Governance,
A Commitment from
MBK Partners and Young Poong
A Commitment from MBK Partners and Young Poong
A Commitment from
MBK Partners and Young Poong
Korea Zinc’s Undervalued Shares
Korea Zinc’s
Undervalued
Shares
Korea Zinc’s
Undervalued Shares
Korea Zinc stands as
the preeminent smelting company,
built on its world-class smelting
technology.
Korea Zinc stands as
the preeminent smelting company, built on its world-class smelting technology.
Korea Zinc stands as the preeminent smelting company,built on its world-class smelting technology.
First
First
Unrivaled Market Share
Unrivaled Market Share
Unrivaled Market Share
Second
Second
Superior Margins
Superior Margins
Superior Margins
Despite Korea Zinc’s sound fundamentals,
the stock price has continued to decline steadily
under Chairman Choi’s leadership.
Despite Korea Zinc’s
sound fundamentals,
the stock price has continued to decline steadily under Chairman Choi’s leadership.
Despite Korea Zinc’s sound fundamentals, the stock price has continued to decline steadily under Chairman Choi’s leadership.
(Following Mr. Choi’s appointment as Chairman in late 2022,
the stock price declined by an additional 5.8%
prior to the tender offer announcement.)
(Following Mr. Choi’s appointment as Chairman in late 2022, the stock price declined by an additional 5.8%
prior to the tender offer announcement.)
Category
Choi’s Appointment
as CEO
Choi’s Appointment
as Chairman
Change
Korea Zinc
6.0%
3.0%
-3.0%p
Industry Peers
3.5%
10.4%
+6.9%p
Category
Korea Zinc
Industry Peers
Choi’s Appointment
as CEO
6.0%
3.5%
Choi’s Appointment
as Chairman
3.0%
10.4%
Change
-3.0%p
+6.9%p
Deteriorating Shareholder Returns,
Placing Korea Zinc at the Bottom of Its Peer Group.
Deteriorating Shareholder Returns, Placing Korea Zinc at the Bottom of Its Peer Group.
Deteriorating Shareholder Returns, Placing Korea Zinc at the Bottom of
Its Peer Group.
The persistent misallocation of corporate funds has resulted in Korea Zinc recording the lowest levels of ROE and PBR.
The persistent misallocation of corporate funds has resulted in Korea Zinc recording the lowest
levels of ROE and PBR.
The persistent misallocation of corporate funds has resulted in Korea Zinc recording the lowest levels of ROE and PBR.
Since Chairman Choi took office,
the company’s capital has not been
utilized efficiently.
Since Chairman Choi
took office, the company’s capital has not been utilized efficiently.
Since Chairman Choi took office, the company’s capital has not been
utilized efficiently.
This has significantly weakened
the company’s profitability and
financial stability.
This has significantly weakened the company’s profitability and financial stability.
This has significantly weakened the company’s profitability and financial stability.
MBK Partners identifies
the following factors as causes for
Korea Zinc's undervaluation
MBK Partners identifies the following factors as causes for Korea Zinc's undervaluation
MBK Partners identifies the following factors as causes for
Korea Zinc's undervaluation
First
Poor Corporate Governance
Poor Corporate Governance
Poor Corporate Governance
Investments Without Board Oversight
Undermining Value of Korea Zinc
Investments Without Board Oversight Undermining
Value of Korea Zinc
Investments Without Board Oversight
Undermining Value of Korea Zinc
Second
Collapsed Corporate Governance
Collapsed Corporate Governance
Collapsed Corporate Governance
Chairman Choi’s Disregard for Shareholders,
Board’s Ineffective Oversight
Chairman Choi’s Disregard
for Shareholders,
Board’s Ineffective Oversight
Chairman Choi’s Disregard for Shareholders,
Board’s Ineffective Oversight
The investment in One Asia Partners,
conducted without a board resolution,
has sparked ongoing controversy.
The investment in One Asia Partners, conducted without a board resolution, has sparked ongoing controversy.
The investment in One Asia Partners, conducted without a board resolution, has sparked ongoing controversy.
KRW 500 billion into funds,
not reported to or reviewed by the board
KRW 500 billion into funds, not reported to or reviewed by the board
KRW 500 billion into funds, not reported to or reviewed by the board
The investment, rooted in the chairman’s
cronyism, resulted in a loss of 147.8 billion KRW
for the company.
The investment, rooted in
the chairman’s cronyism,
resulted in a loss of 147.8 billion KRW for the company.
The investment, rooted in the chairman’s cronyism, resulted in a loss of 147.8 billion KRW for the company.
The investment in the U.S. company
Igneo Holdings is another example of
acquiring a failing company due to
inadequate board oversight and verification.
The investment in the U.S. company Igneo Holdings is
another example of acquiring a failing company due to inadequate board oversight and verification.
The investment in the U.S. company
Igneo Holdings is another example of
acquiring a failing company due to inadequate board oversight and verification.
The discussion material for the board meeting
consisted of a one-page report only...
The discussion material for the board meeting consisted of a one-page report only...
The discussion material for the board meeting
consisted of a one-page report only...
Additionally,
the acquisition was made at an excessively
high valuation, resulting in
an overpayment.
Additionally,
the acquisition was made at an excessively high valuation, resulting in an overpayment.
Additionally,
the acquisition was made at an excessively high valuation, resulting in an overpayment.
Igneo Acquisition
Value Analysis
Igneo Acquisition
Value Analysis
Igneo Acquisition
Value Analysis
(US$mm)
Jungseok Enterprise Investment Timeline
Jungseok Enterprise Investment Timeline
2023/12/18
2023/12/18
Following the liquidation of Justice #1 PEF,
the Jungseok shares were transferred to Korea Zinc.
Following the liquidation
of Justice #1 PEF, the Jungseok
shares were transferred to
Korea Zinc.
2021/3/19
2021/3/19
The Cho family sold 150,469 shares in
Jungseok Enterprise (12.22%) at
KRW 48.15 billion (KRW 320 thousand per share)
to pay inheritance tax.
The Cho family sold 150,469
shares in Jungseok Enterprise
(12.22%) at KRW 48.15 billion
(KRW 320 thousand per share)
to pay inheritance tax.
These shares were acquired
through OneAsia Partners.
These shares were acquired
through OneAsia Partners.
The acquisition price was also excessively high;
the implied EV/EBITDA and P/E were 20.5x and 44.8x,
respectively.
The acquisition price was also
excessively high; the implied
EV/EBITDA and P/E were 20.5x
and 44.8x, respectively.
Economic nature of the transaction was
a securities-backed loan.
Economic nature of the transaction
was a securities-backed loan.
2019
2019
Following the death of the late CEO,
Mr. Cho Yang-ho, his shares in Jungseok Enterprise
were inherited to his family.
Following the death of the late
CEO, Mr. Cho Yang-ho, his shares
in Jungseok Enterprise were
inherited to his family.
There are suspicions of assisting
other chaebols by financing
their inheritance tax payments and
favoring C.S. Design Group
through business allocations.
There are suspicions of assisting other chaebols by financing their inheritance tax payments and favoring C.S. Design Group through business allocations.
There are suspicions of assisting other chaebols by financing their inheritance tax payments and favoring C.S. Design Group through business allocations.
CS Design Group Transaction
CS Design Group Transaction
Building
Services
Value
Youngpoong Bldg.
(Nonhyeon-dong)
Interior Design
KRW 2.1B
Grand Seoul Building (Jongno)
Interior Design
KRW 0.39B
Office building for subsidiary Steelcycle
Architecture/
Interior Design
N/A
Onsan smelter (e.g., parking bldg., central security bldg., safety training center, health center, total safety center, commuter bus stops)
Interior Design
N/A
Building
Services
Value
Youngpoong Bldg.
(Nonhyeon-dong)
Interior Design
KRW 2.1B
Grand Seoul Building (Jongno)
Interior Design
KRW 0.39B
Office building for subsidiary Steelcycle
Architecture/
Interior Design
N/A
Onsan smelter (e.g., parking bldg., central security bldg., safety training center, health center, total safety center, commuter bus stops)
Interior Design
N/A
All of these actions were carried out
without board approval,
Demonstrating the lack of proper oversight
in preventing the misappropriation of
company resources by the management.
All of these actions were carried out without board approval,
Demonstrating the lack of proper oversight in preventing the misappropriation of company resources by the management.
All of these actions were carried out without board approval,
Demonstrating the lack of proper oversight in preventing the misappropriation of company resources by the management.
Chairman Choi,
Chairman Choi,
Chairman Choi,
Category
Investment
Amount
Newly Estabilshed
Fund
OneAsia Partners
KRW 566.9 billion
US Company
Igneo Holdings
KRW 582 bilion
Chaebol,
Family-in-Law
Jungseok Enterprise/
CS Design Group
KRW 52 Bilion
Total
KRW 1.2 trilion
has undertaken inefficient investments
totaling approximately
1.2 trillion KRW.
has undertaken inefficient investments
totaling approximately
1.2 trillion KRW.
has undertaken inefficient investments
totaling approximately 1.2 trillion KRW.
Category
Investment
Amount
Newly Estabilshed
Fund
OneAsia Partners
KRW 566.9 billion
US Company
Igneo Holdings
KRW 582 bilion
Chaebol,
Family-in-Law
Jungseok Enterprise/
CS Design Group
KRW 52 Bilion
Total
KRW 1.2 trilion
The investment failure of
approximately 1.2 trillion KRW is not merely
a waste of cash but also...
The investment failure of approximately 1.2 trillion KRW is not merely a waste of cash, but also...
The investment failure of approximately 1.2 trillion KRW is not merely a waste of cash, but also...
a significant setback, undermining shareholder value growth potential
by an estimated 2.5 trillion KRW.
a significant setback, undermining shareholder value growth potential by an estimated 2.5 trillion KRW.
a significant setback, undermining shareholder value growth potential
by an estimated 2.5 trillion KRW.
Defending Control at the
Expense of Shareholder Value
Defending Control at the
Expense of
Shareholder Value
Defending Control at the
Expense of
Shareholder Value
In the recent management dispute, Chairman Choi demonstrated...
In the recent management dispute, Chairman Choi demonstrated...
In the recent management dispute, Chairman Choi demonstrated...
a clear prioritization of his own interests over those of the shareholders, disregarding their benefits
a clear prioritization of his own interests over those of the shareholders, disregarding their benefits
a clear prioritization of his own interests over those of the shareholders, disregarding their benefits
Self-tender Offer
Self-tender Offer
Self-tender Offer
Depletion of company cash reserves for personal reasons
Deterioration of shareholder value for non-participating shareholders
Increased debt-to-equity ratio
Depletion of company cash reserves for personal reasons
Deterioration of shareholder value for non-participating shareholders
Increased debt-to-equity ratio
Depletion of company cash reserves for personal reasons
Deterioration of shareholder value for non-participating shareholders
Increased debt-to-equity ratio
The Korea Zinc board,
paralyzed in its oversight functions,
has failed to control the decisions of
a CEO pursuing personal interests.
The Korea Zinc board, paralyzed in its oversight functions, has failed to control the decisions of
a CEO pursuing personal interests.
The Korea Zinc board, paralyzed in its oversight functions, has failed to control the decisions of a CEO pursuing personal interests.
Chairman Choi's
recent share repurchase initiative
presents several problems:
Chairman Choi's recent share repurchase initiative
presents several problems:
Chairman Choi's recent share repurchase initiative presents several problems:
Problem 1
Cash Balance Depletion,
Value Deterioration
for Non-participating
Shareholders
Cash Balance Depletion, Value Deterioration for Non-participating Shareholders
Cash Balance Depletion,
Value Deterioration
for Non-participating
Shareholders
Problem 2
Increased in
Debt-to-Equity ratio,
Expensive Borrowing
Increased in Debt-to-Equity ratio, Expensive Borrowing
Increased in
Debt-to-Equity ratio,
Expensive Borrowing
Problem 3
Value destruction and loss
for shareholder due to
the High Offer Price
Value destruction and loss
for shareholder due to the High Offer Price
Value destruction and loss
for shareholder due to
the High Offer Price
General Public Offering
General Public Offering
General Public Offering
Dilution and damage to existing shareholder value
Evidence of violations of the Capital Markets Act
Falsification of Tender Offer Statement
Dilution and damage to existing shareholder value
Evidence of violations of the Capital Markets Act
Falsification of Tender Offer Statement
Dilution and damage to existing shareholder value
Evidence of violations of the Capital Markets Act
Falsification of Tender Offer Statement
Furthermore, Chairman Choi planned
to repay the debt incurred during the tender offer process
by maliciously exploiting shareholder funds
through a large general public offering.
Furthermore, Chairman Choi planned to repay the debt incurred during the tender offer process
by maliciously exploiting shareholder funds through a large general public offering.
Furthermore, Chairman Choi planned to repay the debt incurred during the tender offer process
by maliciously exploiting shareholder funds
through a large general public offering.
However,
However,
However,
the public offering rights issue initiated by Chairman Choi raises significant problems.
the public offering rights issue initiated by Chairman Choi raises significant problems.
the public offering rights issue initiated by Chairman Choi raises significant problems.
Problem 1
Problem 1
Destruction
in Value
Destruction in Value
Destruction
in Value
Problem 2
Problem 2
Unfair Trade
Practice
Unfair Trade Practice
Unfair Trade
Practice
Problem 3
Problem 3
Falsification of
Tender Offer
Statement
Falsification of Tender Offer Statement
Falsification of
Tender Offer
Statement
Following Korea Zinc’s rights
offering announcement,
which tramples on shareholder value,
Following Korea Zinc’s rights offering announcement, which tramples on shareholder value,
Following Korea Zinc’s rights offering announcement, which tramples on shareholder value,
Numerous white knights and
loyal investors have turned their backs.
Numerous white knights and loyal investors have turned their backs.
Numerous white knights and loyal investors have turned their backs.
MBKP and Young Poong are committed
to enhancing Korea Zinc’s value through,
MBKP and Young Poong are committed to enhancing Korea Zinc’s value through,
MBKP and Young Poong are committed
to enhancing Korea Zinc’s value through,
1
1
Improve Corporate Governance by Adopting
Advanced Corporate Governance Practices
Improve Corporate Governance by Adopting
Advanced Corporate Governance Practices
Improve Corporate Governance by Adopting Advanced Corporate Governance Practices
2
2
Prioritize Resources in New Business Development
Prioritize Resources in New Business Development
Prioritize Resources in New Business Development
3
3
Continue to Invest to Maintain & Enhance
Competitiveness as the Global No.1 Smelter
Continue to Invest to Maintain & Enhance Competitiveness as the Global No.1 Smelter
Continue to Invest to Maintain & Enhance Competitiveness as the Global No.1 Smelter
4
4
Revisit Investments in Non-core Businesses
Revisit Investments in Non-core Businesses
Revisit Investments in Non-core Businesses
5
5
Normalize Relationship with Young Poong
and Enhance Market Leadership
Normalize Relationship with Young Poong and Enhance Market Leadership
Normalize Relationship with Young Poong and Enhance Market Leadership
6
6
Continue to Improve Environmental,
Safety Issues, Enhance Job Security
Continue to Improve Environmental, Safety Issues, Enhance Job Security
Continue to Improve Environmental, Safety Issues, Enhance Job Security
We pledge to implement six key initiatives.
We pledge to implement
six key initiatives.
We pledge to implement
six key initiatives.
1
1
Improve Corporate Governance by Adopting
Advanced Corporate Governance Practices
Improve Corporate Governance by Adopting
Advanced Corporate Governance Practices
Improve Corporate Governance by Adopting
Advanced Corporate Governance Practices
As the current board fails to conduct
independent oversight,
As the current board fails to conduct independent oversight,
As the current board fails to conduct
independent oversight,
We will introduce
an executive officer system
aimed at separating ownership and
management within the company.
We will introduce an executive officer system aimed at separating ownership and management within the company.
We will introduce an executive officer system aimed at separating ownership and management within the company.
What is Executive Director
System?
What is Executive
Director System?
What is Executive Director System?
Assigning executive authority exclusively to executive officers while granting
the board supervisory authority over them will enable swift and efficient
decision-making by executive officers and effective oversight by the board.
Assigning executive authority exclusively to executive officers while granting the board supervisory authority over them will enable swift and efficient decision-making by executive officers and effective oversight by the board.
Assigning executive authority exclusively to executive officers while granting the board supervisory authority over them will enable swift and efficient decision-making by executive officers and effective oversight by the board.
Establishing proper governance at Korea Zinc
is entirely aimed at enhancing shareholder value.
Establishing proper governance at Korea Zinc is entirely aimed at enhancing shareholder value.
Establishing proper governance at Korea Zinc
is entirely aimed at enhancing shareholder value.
MBK Partners and Young Poong have the following plans
for shareholder returns and engagement.
MBK Partners and Young Poong
have the following plans for shareholder returns and engagement.
MBK Partners and Young Poong have the following plans for shareholder returns and engagement.
2
Prioritize Resources in New Business Development
Prioritize Resources in New Business Development
Prioritize Resources in New Business Development
2
The current management’s Troika Drive initiatives
The current management’s Troika Drive initiatives
The current management’s Troika Drive initiatives
were conducted simultaneously on all fronts
but have not made much progress
aside from the nickel sulfate/precursor business.
were conducted simultaneously on all fronts but have not made much progress aside from the nickel sulfate / precursor business.
were conducted simultaneously on all fronts
but have not made much progress aside from the nickel sulfate/precursor business.
The market response has been lukewarm
due to delays in demonstrating tangible results
and concerns over the anticipated burden of excessive debt
The market response has been lukewarm due to delays in
demonstrating tangible results and concerns over the anticipated burden of excessive debt
The market response has been lukewarm due to delays in demonstrating tangible results and concerns over the anticipated burden of excessive debt
Borrowing Required to Sustain Smelting Business
Borrowing Required to Sustain Smelting Business
Borrowing Required to Sustain Smelting Business
Expected Debt after the Company’s Planned Investment
Expected Debt after the Company’s Planned Investment
Expected Debt after the Company’s Planned Investment
Lukewarm Market Response
Lukewarm Market Response
Lukewarm Market Response
D
August-November 2023
August-November 2023
August-November 2023
Announcement of a third-party rights
offering to HMG Global, KEMCO consolidation,
the All-in-one Nickel Smelter
Announcement of a third-party rights offering to HMG Global, KEMCO consolidation, the All-in-one Nickel Smelter
Announcement of a third-party rights offering to HMG Global, KEMCO consolidation, the All-in-one Nickel Smelter
C
November 2022
November 2022
November 2022
Expansion of core initiatives, including partnerships with
LG Chem and Hanwha
Expansion of core initiatives, including partnerships with LG Chem and Hanwha
Expansion of core initiatives, including partnerships with LG Chem and Hanwha
B
July-November 2022
July-November 2022
July-November 2022
Acquisition of Igneo Holdings and
capacity expansion of copper foil production
Acquisition of Igneo Holdings and capacity expansion of copper foil production
Acquisition of Igneo Holdings and capacity expansion of copper foil production
A
December 2021
December 2021
December 2021
Official announcement of Troika Drive
Official announcement of Troika Drive
Official announcement of Troika Drive
In pursuing an overly broad range of business ventures
simultaneously, Korea Zinc has failed to deliver on
the promised level of commitment.
In pursuing an overly broad range of business ventures simultaneously,
Korea Zinc has failed to deliver on the promised level of commitment.
In pursuing an overly broad range of business ventures simultaneously, Korea Zinc has failed to deliver on the promised level of commitment.
Troika Drive:
Overpromised, Not Yet Delivered
Troika Drive:
Overpromised, Not Yet Delivered
Swipe left or right on the table.
Promises
Delivery
Resource
Recycling
E-waste (Electrolytic
Copper)
Acquire Igneo and Kataman to secure feed for
not only e-waste but also battery recycling
FAIL
Solar Panel Recycling
(Silver)
Leverage Igneo’s “proven technology” to add
two plants and six hubs in North America
FAIL
EV Battery Recycling
(Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium)
Plans to build a waste battery pre-treatment
plant abroad in 2023
FAIL
EV Battery
Materials
Nickel Sulfate/
Precursors
Build a new “all-in-one nickel smelter”
Mass-produce/sell precursors in partnership with LG Chem
Well Done
Copper Foil
(2Q ’22 IR) “mass-production preparations on
track”; scheduled for 3Q ’23
(2Q ’23 IR) Mass-production to begin in 4Q ’23
FAIL
Renewable
Energy /
Hydrogen
Solar / Wind
KRW 8.3 trillion CAPEX investment in Australia
until 2033 to expand power generation capacity
(4.6 GW)
FAIL
Green Hydrogen
Target production of roughly 280 kt of green H2
annually by 2030; plan to start test production by end of 2024
FAIL
Promises
Delivery
Resource
Recycling
E-waste (Electrolytic
Copper)
Acquire Igneo and Kataman to secure feed for
not only e-waste but also battery recycling
FAIL
Solar Panel Recycling
(Silver)
Leverage Igneo’s “proven technology” to add
two plants and six hubs in North America
FAIL
EV Battery Recycling
(Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium)
Plans to build a waste battery pre-treatment
plant abroad in 2023
FAIL
EV Battery
Materials
Nickel Sulfate/
Precursors
Build a new “all-in-one nickel smelter”
Mass-produce/sell precursors in partnership with LG Chem
Well Done
Copper Foil
(2Q ’22 IR) “mass-production preparations on
track”; scheduled for 3Q ’23
(2Q ’23 IR) Mass-production to begin in 4Q ’23
FAIL
Renewable
Energy /
Hydrogen
Solar / Wind
KRW 8.3 trillion CAPEX investment in Australia
until 2033 to expand power generation capacity
(4.6 GW)
FAIL
Green Hydrogen
Target production of roughly 280 kt of green H2
annually by 2030; plan to start test production by end of 2024
FAIL
MBK Partners and Young Poong,
MBK Partners and Young Poong,
MBK Partners and Young Poong,
plan to reassess the timing and
approach of investments in each business,
executing new business investments
sequentially based on clear priorities.
plan to reassess the timing and approach of investments in each business, executing new
business investments
sequentially based on clear priorities.
plan to reassess the timing and approach of investments in each business, executing new business investments sequentially based on clear priorities.
Required Capabilities
Market Environment
Prioritize Investments
(Accelerate/Decelerate)
Resource
Recycling
E-waste (Electrolytic
Copper)
Accelerate
Solar Panel Recycling
(Silver)
Decelerate
EV Battery Recycling
(Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium)
Accelerate
EV Battery
Materials
Nickel Sulfate/
Precursors
Accelerate
Copper Foil
Decelerate
Renewable
Energy /
Hydrogen
Solar / Wind
Accelerate
Green Hydrogen
N/A (Market yet
to take-off)
Decelerate
Swipe left or right on the table.
Required Capabilities
Market Environment
Prioritize Investments
(Accelerate/Decelerate)
Resource
Recycling
E-waste (Electrolytic
Copper)
Accelerate
Solar Panel Recycling
(Silver)
Decelerate
EV Battery Recycling
(Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium)
Accelerate
EV Battery
Materials
Nickel Sulfate/
Precursors
Accelerate
Copper Foil
Decelerate
Renewable
Energy /
Hydrogen
Solar / Wind
Accelerate
Green Hydrogen
N/A (Market yet
to take-off)
Decelerate
The Consortium projects that our new business proposal, will generate
The Consortium projects that our new business proposal, will generate
The Consortium projects that our new business proposal, will generate
in revenues over the
next three years
in revenues over the next three years
in revenues over the next three years
We believe Korea Zinc will be able to
achieve meaningful transformation
based on its competitiveness
in the core smelting business.
We believe Korea Zinc will be able to achieve meaningful transformation based on its competitiveness in the core smelting business.
We believe Korea Zinc will be able to
achieve meaningful transformation
based on its competitiveness in the core smelting business.
Additionally,
We will enhance Korea Zinc's corporate value
through improvements across various areas.
Additionally,
We will enhance Korea Zinc's corporate value
through improvements
across various areas.
Additionally,
We will enhance Korea Zinc's corporate value through improvements across various areas.
Invest to maintain Global No.1 Smelter
Invest to maintain Global No.1 Smelter
・Invest in World-Class Smelting Technology
・Stabilize Raw Material Sourcing,
Maintain Cost Competitiveness
・Maintain a Flexible Sales Network
・Invest in World-Class Smelting Technology.
・Stabilize Raw Material Sourcing, Maintain Cost Competitiveness.
・Maintain a Flexible Sales Network.
Revisit Investments in Non-core Businesses
Revisit Investments in Non-core Businesses
・Recover funds through appropriate procedures
・Enhancing the core smelting business
・Advancing prioritized new business initiatives
・Recover funds through appropriate procedures.
・Enhancing the core smelting business.
・Advancing prioritized new business initiatives.
Normalize Relationship with Young Poong and Enhance Market Leadership
Normalize Relationship with Young Poong and Enhance Market Leadership
・Raw Material Procurement
・Secondary Material Supply
・Joint Sales
・Raw Material Procurement.
・Secondary Material Supply.
・Joint Sales.
Continue to Improve Environmental, Safety Issues, Enhance Job Security
Continue to Improve Environmental, Safety Issues, Enhance Job Security
・Institutional Improvements / Carbon Reduction
・Job Security
・Community Engagement / Workplace Safety
・Institutional Improvements / Carbon Reduction
・Job Security
・Community Engagement / Workplace Safety
Together with MBK Partners and Young Poong,
We are rebuilding Korea Zinc into a stronger,
more competitive company,
paving the way for sustainable growth.
Together with
MBK Partners and Young Poong,
We are rebuilding Korea Zinc into a stronger, more competitive company, paving the way for sustainable growth.
Together with MBK Partners and Young Poong,
We are rebuilding Korea Zinc into a stronger, more competitive company,
paving the way for sustainable growth.
